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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
CLARENCE P. MARTIN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Case No. 7766

RALPH L. JONES dba MOUNTAIR
PHARMACY,
Defendant and Respondent

ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Respondent in his Petition for Rehearing has sep,.
arated his argument into two phases (1) the owner'~
liability to a trespasser; (2) contributory negligence.

The owner's liability to a trespasser
Respondent states at page 2 of its Petition for
Rehearing:
( 1)
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"In his opinion Justice Wolfe assumes that the
plaintiff was a trespasser and he departs from
the rule established by the decisions of the courts to
follow the academic statement in the 'Restatement
of the Law of Torts,' which, we submit, if given
practical application virtually makes the possessor
of real property an insurer of the safety of all
persons who, having no right to go upon his property, are injured by some conditition which, though
it may be dangerous to such trespasser, the owner
desires for his own convenience to maintain . . . "
Respondent's conclusion that the rule as given in the
Restatement is merely academic and has no practical ap ..
plication is erroneous. The courts have sustained generally the proposition as set forth in the Restatement. It is
submitted that there will not be found in the cases a
direct quotation as found in the Restatement. However,
this same result is reached by the courts under various
doctrines such as pitfalls, traps, nuisances, or that in a
situation similar to the case at bar failure to warn
amounts to wilful, wanton or reckless conduct.
In 38 American Jurisprudence Par. 113, NEGLIEGENCE, it is stated:
"Warning Trespasser of Danger. Generally
speaking, an owner or occupant of real property is
under no duty to a trespasser in respect of the condition of the premises. Some courts have gone quite
far in the protection afforded to trespassers, holding
that when the owner or occupant knows of their presence upon his premises and their probable ignorance of perils thereon he is bound to give them notice of the danger. But it would seem that the
dangerous instrumentality, in such case, must be
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such as to constitute a nuisance; or the situation
must be such that the failure to give a warning
amounts to wilful, wanton or reckless conduct,
or to a breach of the duty of ordinary care which is
owed by an owner or occupant to a trespasser who
is discovered to be in peril."
In the case of Central Georgia Power Co. v. Walker,
20 Ga. A. 645, 647, 93 SE 306, the court held that the
plaintiff was a trespasser and at page 306 of the SE
Reporter it states:

"* * * The plain answer to this assumption is
that, between the defendant and the plaintiff, considering the latter as a trespasser, there was no relation which per se gave rise to any duty. The duty
to a trespasser does not flow from the relation; none
exists, except a wrongful relation. It can arise only
with the peril to the trespasser. Until the peril arises,
and until the defendant knows of the peril to the
trespasser, there can be no duty to warn the trespasser * * *''
Volume I, Summary of California Law by Witkin,
Sixth Edition, page 740, states:
"Duty Toward Known Trespassers. The Torts
Restatement (pars. 336, 337) declares that where
the defendant knows or should know that a trespasser has come on the land, he has the duty to
warn of artificial conditions constituting concealed
dangers, and to exercise reasonable care in carrying
on activities. This same result has been reached
under the theory that failure to warn of a trap or
pitfall, or to conduct activities with due care toward a known trespasser, amounts to 'wilful or wanton' conduct. * * *
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* * * But where the defendant neither knows of the
plaintiff's presence, nor has any reason to expect
him to be there, the duty does not exist."
In the case of Blaycock v. Coates, et al, 44 C app 2d
850 113 P 2d 256, the plaintiff, a girl of 13 years, was
walking with her two sisters and a boy along the highway about a mile from their home. Her dog ran loose
and became mired in a sump about 250 feet long and
100 feet wide. The surface of the sump was covered with
sand or dirt, the underneath part was oil. As she went
in and tried to extricate her dog from the sump, she became stuck herself. The court stated at 113 P. 2nd, page
257:
· "Defendant argues that the sump was not an
'attractive' nuisance. That since plaintiff was a
trespasser, defendant was under no obligation to
plaintiff to keep the premises in a safe condition
although the trial court found that defendant knew
that it (the sump) was attractive to children. The
liability of defendant need not be predicated upon
the attractive nuisance doctrine. The conclusion
of the trial court may be sustained under the general rule that a land owner may not construct or
maintain a trap or pitfall into which he knows or
has reason to believe that a trespasser will probably
fall. The liability of the owner in such cases depends
upon the circumstances surrounding the maintenance of the 'trap', the extent of the danger involved
and the comparative ease or difficulty of preventing
the danger without disturbing or impairing the
usefullness of the thing which is claimed to be a
trap or pitfall. Upon the trial judge the duty is
placed of determining the issue of liability in view
of all the conditions shown by the evidence. In
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support of plaintiff's contention that the trial court
was justified in concluding that the defendant is
liable plaintiff properly cites the case of Malloy v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Society, 3 Cal Unrep 76, 21
P. 525, a case in which the owner was held
liable where a child fell into a cess pool on the defendant's property about ten feet from the sidewalk.
In referring to this case it was said in Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Cal 214, 217, 65 P 379, 380: 'It is true
that damages were there sought for the death of an
infant, occasioned by falling into a cess pool; but the
complaint would have been sufficient to have warranted a recovery had an adult been killed under
the same circumstances for the complaint showed
a veritable trap,-a cesspool, open and unguarded,
yet with its surface covered with a layer of deceptive earth to a level with the adjacent land, into
such a trap anyone, adult or child might have
walked.'"
In the case of Euclid-105th Streets Property Co.
v. Beckman, 42 NE 2nd 789, the landlord, owner of the
property, had covered a skylight of glass with roofing
of tar paper and graveled over it so that it had the
appearance of a roof. Th~ employees had frequently seen
servants and tenants washing the windows standing
upon the covered skylight. One of the tenants fell
through the skylight as a result of the tar paper giving
way. The court stated in 42 NE 2d, at page 791:
"We have gone over this record and have taken
up all the errors and we cannot agree with the
learned counsel for the defendant that the court
erred in not directing a verdict either at the close
of plaintiff's testimony or at the close of all the
testimony. If we understand the law upon this subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ject it is that while the defendant is not liable for
ordinary negligence to a trespasser or a licensee,
perhaps owing a less duty to a trespasser than to a
licensee, yet we think the law is very clear, confining
our attention to that of the licensee only, because we
think that is what this woman was in the instant
case, while we admit that the owner of the premises
would not be liable for ordinary negligence to a
licnsee, yet where a situation is created and tolerated
by the defendant, the owner of the premises, which
amounts to a trap or hidden danger covered up,
and the licensee is injured by reason of that danger
or trap, as one might say, the defendant is responsible and liable for the damages that result
therefrom."
In the case of Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 110,
193 A 608, the court was particularly interested in
the Restatement of Torts, par. 339 with respect to the
duty of a land owner with reference to trespassing
children when they know of their presence or should
know of their presence. The court, however, made this
statement at page 610, the Atlantic Reporter:
" * * *The court accurately instructed the jury
that the owner of the land is not bound to anticipate
the presence of trespassers or keep a lookout for
them or maintain his premises in a safe condition for
them, but that when he knows, or under all the circumstances, should know, that a trespass is being
committed, it is his duty to exercise reasonable care
to prevent an injury to the intruder.
"The court's reasoning and as put forth by the
lower court was to the effect that the dangerous condition; i.e., the stacking of the lumber upon the land
ower's premises for the construction of a new house,
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...

constituted a dangerous condition which could be
found to be a nuisance.''
The court stated at page 611: "* * * One of the
plaintiff's claims was that the pile of lumber as it
stood upon defendant's land constituted a nuisance,
and the court correctly charged the jury that if the
natural tendency of the act complained of was to
create danger and inflict injury upon person or property, it might properly be found a nuisance as a matter of fact."
In the case of McPheters v. Loomis, 125 Conn. 526,
7 A 2d 437 the facts are that a boy was found crushed
beneath a telephone pole some ten days after the pole
had been left at the side of the road. The company was
chargeable with the proposition that people had trespassed along this route. The court stated at page 440:

"* * * In other words this boy was a trespasser
as to the Western Union and the Western Union
ordinarily owed the boy no duty and the duty came
into existence only if a nuisance existed, or if the
Western Union was negligent in permitting a dangerous condition to remain upon its premises of which
it had use, if children were actually trespassing, and
if it knew of that fact, or ought to have known of it.

"* * * However, under our law when the presence of the trespasser becomes known, the land
owner owes a duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him * * * but, if the owner or his servants
know that the presence of trespassers is to be expected, then the common obligation of exercising
reasonable care gives rise to the correlative duty of
taking such precautions against injuring trespassers
as a reasonable fore-sight of harm ought to suggest."
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The Pennsylvania court in the case of Frederick v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. 337 Pa 13'6, 10 A 2d 576
gives a good definition of a case of wilful or wanton
negligence. In this case a passenger fell beneath the
train. The conductor after being advised that someone
was down there made a careful search but apparently
did not find the body so he started the train. The plaintiff was horribly injured. The court stated at page 578
Atl. Reporter:
"The legal obligation to trespassers has been
traditionally stated to be the avoidance of wilful
or wanton negligence. Willful negligence is an obvious misnomer. Wanton negligence, as distinguished from ordinary negligence, is characterized by a
realization on the part of the tort feazor or at least
ization on the part of the tort feazor-or at least
what would cause such a realization to a reasonable
man,-or the probability of injury to another, and by
a reckless disregard, nevertheless of the consequences. As applied to the type of cases of which the
present is an example, it is not wanton negligence
to fail to use care to discover the presence of an unanticipated trespasser, but it is wanton negligence,
within the meaning of the law, to fail to use ordinary and reasonable care to avoid injury to a trespasser after his presence has been ascertained."
Professor Bohlen, in an article in the Harvard Law
Review, March 1937, entitled "Fifty Years of Torts"
summarizes the evolution of the trespasser. He states at
page 736:
"Even before 1886 the wind had somewhat
changed. The individual citizen's interest in his personal safety, in which the state also soon came to be
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recognized as having an interest, began to be given a sufficient importance to deprive land owners
of some of their original immunities. (9) Today the
trespasser may recover under many circumstances
under which fifty years ago recovery would have
been denied him. While the old formula that a possessor of land is liable to a trespasser or even to a
bare licensee only for wanton or wilful misconduct
remains in customary use, its content has been so
changed as to contradict the words which express it.
''In many jurisdictions it is held that a land
owner who knows that trespassers are in the habit
of intruding upon a limited part of his premises
may not without warning introduce into such part
a dangerous animal or create a dangerous condition
which is abnormal to the land and which, therefore,
the trespassers have no reason to expect to find
therein. The extreme danger to those who cross railway tracks in ignorance of the approaching trains
has lead courts to require warnings to be given at
points on their rights of way where to the knowledge of the railway the public are accustomed to
cross. The mere posting of notice forbidding trespass is not enough to absolve the railway. Warning
must be given.
"Again, enough persists of the privilege of land
owners to ignore the even probable intrusions of trespassers upon their land, to protect the land owners
from liability for acts which are recognizably likely to injure trespassers who may, without the
knowledge to the owner, roam at large over the
land. Nonetheless, there are many jurisdictions
which, while persisting in the formula that toward
the trespasser the land owner owes no duties save
to refrain from inflicting wanton or wilful injuries,
hold that upon the discovery of a trespasser, the
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failure to use such care .as would be required in a
neutral place is wanton or wilful misconduct."
For other cases bearing out these same propositions
see:
Hobbs v. George W. Blanchard & Sons Co. 74
NH 116, 65 A 382, Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal 345,
47 P. 113, 598, 156 ALR p. 1237. "In some cases it
appears ·tnat the courts have assumed that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a licensee did
not result from any 'active' or 'affirmative' negligence on the part of the licensor. Also, Millspough
v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. 1938, 1048 Ind.
App. 540, 12 NE 2nd 396 (action for death of a decedent who drowned while fishing on stream upon
defendant's premises when his boat was drawn
through a breach in an old dam); Gallagher v. Fordham and L Co. 1939, NYS 2nd 322 (injuries sustained by 8 year old licensee in a fall into a hole at the
bottom of a slope on defendant's vacant lot); Pafford v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co. 1940, 217, NC 730,
9 SE 2nd 408 (injuries from a fall into an open elevator shaft in a building under construction); Galveston, H & S AR Co. v. Matzdorf 1908, 102 Tex
42, 112 SW 1036, 20 LRA (Ns) 833, 132 AM ST REP
849, (injuries resulting from a fall over a piece of
wire projecting from a door mat).
It is apparent from a reading of the cases that the
rule of the Restatement and as quoted in the majority
opinion in the prior decision of this court is supported
by the cases under the general propositions of nuisances,
pitfalls, traps, etc. There certainly can be no basis to respondent's argument that this court is adopting a new
academic statement which has no practical application.
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(2)

Contributory Negligence.

Respondent's argument that appellant is guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law can certainly
have no application to the case at bar. Justice Wolfe
in tb ~ majority opinion issued prior to the rehearing
wen1 into this question quite thoroughly on the bases
ur th2 case of Knox v. Snow- U -, 229 P 2d 874. In
that case the court accepted the general rule regarding
contributory negligence as stated in 38 Am Juris, Negligence, page 861:
'~It

is said that wlien the defense of contributory
negligence is urged as a ground for a non suit, it
must appear that reasonable men acting as triers of
fact would find without any reasonable probability
of differing in their means, either that the plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger, or that ordinarily prudent men under similar circumstances
would readily acquire such knowledge and appreciation. As it generally is expressed, a plaintiff will
not be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence if it appears that he had no knowledge or
means of knowledge of the danger and conversely,
he will be deemed to have been guilty if it is shown
that he knew or reasonably should have known of
the peril and might have avoided it by the exercise
of ordinary care."
There is nothing in this case with reference to the
premises which would reasonably inform the appellant of
any trap, pitfall or dangerous condition existing on the
premises. The jury could certainly find that it was
reasonable under these circumstances for the appellant
to give his attention to the merchandise which he was
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interested in purchasing and ignore the floor. The question is one to be decided by the jury as to the many factors involved.
Justice Hendricks in his dissenting opinion concludes
that the hole in the floor was open, i.e., that the elevator
was in the "up" position; that the light in the basement
was on which would clearly make the hole discernible;
that a man the size of appellant could not fall through
a two-foot hole and, therefore, the appellant jumped
into the hole with "both feet;" that defendant had been
a salesman and man about town for 20 years and, therefore, well acquainted with the liquor laws pertaining to
the sale of liquor; that Mrs. Cannon did not see appellant go through the hole, that she was looking in another
direction "waiting to usher him out sans a bottle of liquor;" that Mrs. Cannon had a right to assume appellant
would move in only one direction and that would be
away from the hole; that a lighting expert testified that
a lighting "gadget" proved that the store lighting system made the floor as "light as day." Based upon these
assumptions and some others that he sets forth in his
dissenting opinion, it is concluded that the appellant
is negligent as a matter of law and hence there is no
reason for these matters to be submitted to a jury for
a determination.
In the first place there is a dispute in the evidence
as to whether or not the elevator was in the ''up" position. See R. 78, 80. 81, 174. There is no evidence in the
record to indicate whether there was a light on in the
basement or not. The assumption that appellant could
not fall through the two-foot hole in the floor is abso-
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lutely without basis in the record. There is nothing
that would indicate that appellant jumped through the
hole. The testimony of Mrs. Cannon, the respondent's
own witness, is to the effect that she saw Mr. Martin
fall through the hole. R. 74. Furthermore at page 87
in the record it is explicitly set out that the respondent's
own witness testified that the fall was an obstructed
fall, causing a rubbing sound. R. 49, 77. The conclusion
that appellant is a salesman and man about town and
therefore acquainted with the liquor laws has no basis
in the record. The statement that Mrs. Cannon did not
see appellant go through the hole because she was looking in another direction "waiting to usher him out sans a
bottle of liquor" is erroneous. Mrs. Cannon testified that
she saw Mr. Martin fall through the hole. R. 174. Furthermore, how Justice Hendricks can conclude that Mrs.
Cannon had a right to assume the appellant would move
in only one direction is incomprehensible. A reading of
the record by appellant does not indicate anything to
the effect that the lighting expert testified that the store
lighting system made the floors light as day. Mr. Felt's
statements were that for particular conditions certain
foot candles of light were required, such as for aisles,
auditoriums, passageways, etc. Questions that have
been raised by Justice Hendricks in his dissenting opinion show clearly the necessity for a jury determination
as to whether the appellant was guilty of contributory
negligence.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, appellant respectfully contends that
the majority decision heretofore rendered by this court
should be reaffirmed and the matter remitted to the
trial court for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
McCullough, Boyce & McCullough
Attorneys for Appellant
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